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Changing Attitudes of Hungarian Political Elites 
Towards the EU (2007-2014) 
Borbála Göncz & György Lengyel ∗ 
Abstract: »Die sich wandelnden Einstellungen der ungarischen politischen Eli-
ten gegenüber der EU (2007-2014)«. One of the main determinants of general 
attitudes towards the EU is the perception of the domestic economic and polit-
ical performance while national elites also play an important role. The Hungari-
an economic crisis, paired with the erosion of the support for the political 
power in government started earlier (in 2006) than the global financial and 
economic crisis that further deteriorated the economic and political situation. 
Hungary was one of the first EU countries that had to rely on an IMF loan. The 
change in governance in 2010 meant a change in the parliamentarian elite and 
a significant shift in public discourses about the EU. The raising dissatisfaction 
of citizens also resulted in the rise of a right wing extremist party. The purpose 
of this paper is to examine the evolution of attitudes of the Hungarian political 
(parliamentarian) elite towards the EU in this changing political context in 
times of economic recession and changing public discourses on the EU. The pa-
per investigates the changing perception of the role the EU played during the 
crisis, the changes in the perception of European social solidarity and how the 
European construct should look like taking into account the changed party 
structure of the Hungarian Parliament. The paper builds on survey data collect-
ed among MPs in 2007 and 2009 within the IntUne project as well as in 2014 
within the ENEC project. 
Keywords: European Union, political elites, attitudes, Hungary, social solidarity, 
nationalism, federalism, crisis management, illiberal democracy, tax redistribu-
tion, populism. 
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1.  Introduction1 
The post-socialist transformation of Hungary was paved by a broad elite con-
sent concerning the peaceful character of transformation, respect of human- and 
property rights, parliamentary democracy and Euro-Atlantic orientation.  
Before Hungary’s accession to the European Union in 2004 there was a con-
sensus among the political elites about the benefits of the membership as well. 
At that time, only FIDESZ, then in opposition, expressed some reservations, 
nevertheless, the vote on the accession in the Hungarian Parliament was unan-
imous.  
Since then, the Hungarian political landscape has gone through important 
changes. Although simulation of democratic rules of the game and signs of a 
weakening elite consensus around the liberal democratic model started already 
in the 1990s, these have become more apparent since the mid-2000s (Lengyel 
and Ilonszki 2010, Ilonszki and Lengyel 2012). 
The economic crisis, paired with the erosion of the support for the political 
power in government started earlier than the global financial and economic 
crisis that further deteriorated the economic and political situation. Hungary 
was one of the first EU countries that had to rely on an IMF loan in this period. 
This and the collapse of former elite consent lead to a change in government at 
the 2010 elections, also called landslide elections due to the resulting changes, 
when the conservative FIDESZ won two-third majority, became a party of 
constitutionalizing capability and managed to keep its position at the next, 
2014, elections within a changed legal context and a shrunk Parliament.2  
The change in governance in 2010 was accompanied with a change in the 
parliamentarian elite as well. The raising dissatisfaction of citizens resulted in 
the rise of a right wing extremist party, Jobbik, while parties of the transition 
like the liberal SZDSZ and the conservative MDF disappeared. The change of 
the political and economic context resulted in a significant shift in public dis-
courses about the EU. While the economic benefits of Hungary’s EU member-
ship cannot be ignored, the EU increasingly appears in a symbolic discourse, 
where it is often attributed a negative role, or there is a double communication 
from the governing party with different messages to the Hungarian general 
public and to the international community. 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the evolution of attitudes of the 
Hungarian political (parliamentarian) elite towards the EU in this changing 
political context in times of economic recession and changing public discourses 
on the EU. The paper investigates the changing perception of the role the EU 
                                                             
1  The authors received a grant from the Hungarian Scientific Research Fund (OTKA, 110917) 
during the writing of this article. 
2  The electoral law CCIII/2011 decreased the number of MPs from 389 to 199. 
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played during the crisis, the changes in the perception of European social soli-
darity and how the European construct should look like taking into account the 
changed party structure of the Hungarian Parliament. The objective of the 
paper is to explore how the changing attitudes are linked to the economic crisis 
and the changed structure of the Parliament. The analysis builds on survey data 
collected among MPs in 2007 and 2009 within the INTUNE project and in 
2014 within the ENEC project. Changing perceptions will be dealt with 
through the comparison of the three waves of the research. 
The paper is structured as follows. The first part will sum up the theoretical 
frame and the main goals of the paper. It is followed by a descriptive analysis 
of the changing perceptions. Then the factors influencing attitudes will be 
addressed through multivariate regression models. Finally the main findings 
will be summarized. 
2.  Background 
One of the main determinants of general attitudes towards the EU is the percep-
tion of economic and political performance of national elites (Gabel 1998, Best 
et al. 2012). People usually lack information and even interest to some extent in 
European Union matters. The perception of the domestic political arena seems 
to be an important driver of general attitudes (Anderson 1998, Sánchez-Cuenca 
2000, Gabel and Scheve 2007 and Rohrschneider 2002): political elites are part 
of this context being able to influence public opinion. What further gives the 
importance of the analysis of national elite’s opinion is that they are key actors 
deciding about EU-issues determining this way not only the public opinion on 
the matter but also the future of the European integration process.  
Furthermore, this paper focuses on the effect of the crisis on national politi-
cal elites’ opinions. Changes in economic environments might result in stress to 
political systems which might lead to the erosion of support (Easton 1965). The 
economic crisis within the European Union can be considered to be such a type 
of stressor. Although this approach holds for the general public, the effect of 
the crisis on national elite’s opinion is of particular interest. Growing stress 
might lead to deepening elite conflicts or distortion of the political regime. In 
this paper two effects of the crisis will be dealt with: changing perceptions of 
social solidarity and the changes along the kind of European Union political 
elites would be in favour of.  
The concept of solidarity usually appears attached to the concept of social 
cohesion or social integration. Willingness to show solidarity with society (in 
terms of social and fiscal contribution) is one of the three constituting elements 
of social cohesion defined by Therborn (1999) besides trust in institutions and a 
feeling of belonging based on one’s social integration.  
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Solidarity is organizing the discourse about European integration since the 
1950s, the main aim being to increase social cohesion within and across Mem-
ber States. However, lately the focus of the general discourse has changed 
putting the concept of democracy at the center (Niznik 2012). Nevertheless, the 
question of European social solidarity gained importance again because of the 
crisis which is in a certain way testing solidarity across the EU. The process 
involving emerging solidarities within and across national settings has an inte-
grative role and manifesting in certain social policies. At the EU level solidari-
ty can be seen as shared values as well as policy programmes (Ellison 2012). 
Social solidarity involves responsibility for the well-being of group members 
and the readiness to give up autonomy (Niznik 2012), which are all dependent 
on the feeling of unity of a certain group. Solidarity at the EU level, this way, is 
linked to the issue of legitimacy of the EU, the theories about the emergence of 
a European society and also to the formation of collective identities. At the 
policy level, solidarity is decisive for the cohesion policy and enlargement 
questions of the EU. 
Furthermore, social solidarity might not only be directed towards group 
members, i.e. towards other Europeans. Social solidarity conceived as shared 
values and understood as an inclusive concept might also be extended towards 
non group members, i.e. non-Europeans. The perception of the phenomenon of 
migration from third country was always a test of solidarity and a measure of 
one’s Europeanness – whether it is inclusive or exclusive. This way the percep-
tion of immigrants is also a measure of social solidarity and is linked to the 
formation of collective identities.  
Different models of ideology or contestation exist on the European integra-
tion process, different ideas exist about how the construction of the European 
Union should look like. There are different perceptions of European integration 
regarding to what extent national sovereignty should be preserved or to what 
extent delegation of political power would be favoured and in what domain. 
One obvious cleavage is related to the traditional intergovernmentalist vs. 
federalist approach with different role attributed to the Member States or na-
tions and the delegation of policy competences and decisions to the European 
Union. Another cleavage is between left and right within the political continu-
um which can relate to the perception of the integration process in several ways 
according to several authors where four basic approaches have been identified 
(Steenbergen and Marks 2004). A left-right position may be irrelevant for the 
attitudes towards integration: liberal intergovernmentalists, in a functionalist 
logic, argue that integration is a rational choice of governments for solving 
problems of international trade (e.g. Moravcsik 1998). Attitudes towards inte-
gration may be independent from the left-right positions as national sovereignty 
issues are cross-cutting political parties (e.g. Hix and Lord 1997). An opposite 
view suggests that attitudes towards integration may be fused in left-right posi-
tions (e.g. Tsebelis and Garrett 2000) where the left would stand for common 
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economic regulation across the EU, while the right would favour less EU regu-
lations. And finally attitudes towards integration and left-right positions are 
linked but not necessarily fused with each other (e.g. Hooghe and Marks 1999). 
In Hooghe and Marks’s model contestation happens between those for a regu-
lated capitalism and those favouring neoliberalism. The previous group is more 
likely to be found among leftist social democrats favouring supranational regu-
lation, while the latter is rather characterizing the political right rejecting su-
pranational authority. The aim in this paper is to follow how attitudes towards 
European integration in terms of the favoured kind of EU, measured along the 
nation vs. EU dimension, have changed due to the crisis.  
3.  Changes in Attitudes 
3.1  Changing Perception of the Benefits of the EU and the Role 
the EU Played During the Crisis 
In 2007 more than four out of five Hungarian MPs gave positive answer on the 
question whether taking everything into consideration the country has on bal-
ance benefited from being a member of the European Union (see Table 1). 
Their proportion grew nine to ten in 2009 and decreased back four to five after 
the landslide elections of 2010. Due to the original ceiling effect these changes 
proved to be statistically insignificant. The overwhelming majority has thought 
and still thinks that the country has benefited from the membership.  
Although the former governing party, the socialist MSZP has always been 
more positive in this respect than the current party in governance, FIDESZ, 
there seemed to be a consensus among the political elites regarding the out-
come of EU membership: differences among the parties were not significant in 
2007 and in 2009. In 2014 this tendency has changed, mainly due to the newly 
emerging far-right party, Jobbik. MPs of the latter have doubts about the bene-
fits, they declared that they are against asymmetric internal relations of the EU, 
although not against membership as such. With these tendencies the Hungarian 
political elites’ enthusiasm was slightly below the average of other countries 
included in the research3 all over the studied period.  
  
                                                             
3  Bulgaria, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Portugal, Spain. 
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Table 1: Changes in the Perception of Benefits from EU Membership,  
2007-2014 (%)4 
  All 
parties 
Party Cramer’s V (com-
parison across 
parties) 
 
p-
value FIDESZ MSZP 
2007 Has benefited 85.0 68.0 92.7  n.s. 
Has not benefited 12.5 28.0 4.9 
Refused 2.5 4.0 2.4 
n 80 25 41 
2009 Has benefited 88.9 68.4 95.0 .301 .075 
Has not benefited 8.3 31.6 0.0 
Don’t know 1.4 0.0 2.5 
Refused 1.4 0.0 2.5 
N 72 19 40 
2014 Has benefited 78.9 93.8 100.0 .654 .000 
Has not benefited 17.5 6.3 0.0 
Don’t know 1.8 0.0 0.0 
Refused 1.8 0.0 0.0 
n 57 32 8 
Note: The exact wording of the question was: “Taking everything into consideration, would 
you say that (YOUR COUNTRY) has on balance benefited or not from being a member of the 
European Union? (1) Has benefited, (2) Has not benefited, (3) Don’t know, (4) Refused”. 
 
Table 2 shows the impact of the landslide elections of 2010 concerning crisis 
management mechanisms. In 2009 supranational intervention of financial insti-
tutions and federalist EU-intervention options were more popular among Hun-
garian MPs than intergovernmentalist or nationalist solutions. The distribution 
of the opinions in 2009 was more balanced, only the least popular solution: the 
autonomous national action got significantly less weight than the other three. 
The impact of the landslide election of 2010 was twofold: it did reshape the 
composition of the Parliament providing 2/3 majority for the right-wing 
FIDESZ (and the satellite Christian Democratic Party). The other impact was 
the change in discourse. By 2014 the opinions became more polarized. In 2014 
economic nationalism (autonomous action of national government) became the 
most popular option to reduce economic crisis followed by the intergovernmen-
talist solution (coordinated action of national governments). Supranational 
institutional and federalist solutions – intervention of the international financial 
organizations and of the EU – became the least popular solutions.  
It seems that both Parliament’s composition and the discourse had their im-
pact on perception of crisis management solutions, but changing composition 
was more important in this respect than changing ideological rhetoric. Socialist 
                                                             
4  Here and in the following tables we present the breakdowns of the two major parties: 
FIDESZ and MSZP. Satellites and newly emerging small party formations are not detailed in 
the tables, but are taken into account in the ‘All parties’ column and briefly mentioned in 
the text where appropriate. 
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MPs didn’t change their mind in terms of favourable crisis management alter-
natives, their number however decreased significantly. The size of the FIDESZ 
fraction grew and their opinion has changed in parallel with this: they don’t 
support the intervention of the EU and put emphasis on economic nationalism 
and intergovernmentalism. The rhetoric turn of FIDESZ and its satellite, the 
Christian Democratic KDNP started immediately after winning the landslide 
2010 elections. The essence of the turn is not the strengthening of economic 
nationalism alone. The decreasing popularity of intervention of the EU could 
be witnessed at the same time. In the case of intervention of supranational 
financial institutions these were the least popular among FIDESZ MPs previ-
ously, its’ acceptance further decreased but the change was not significant. 
Change in another direction characterized the intergovernmentalist solution: 
its’ original popularity grew further, but the change proved to be insignificant. 
The newly emerging far-right Jobbik opted against supranational, federalist and 
intergovernmentalist solutions in 2014 (the party was not in the Parliament in 
2009). One of the other new formations (around the threshold) the green LMP 
in this respect behaved similarly, except that they opted for the intergovern-
mentalist solution and against economic nationalism. The new left-liberal 
fragments (Együtt, DK) opted for the federalist solution over average.  
Table 2: Alternatives to Reduce Economic Crisis: Opinion of Hungarian MPs in 
2009 and 2014 (%) 
  2009 n 2014 n Phi p-value 
Intervention of the 
international financial 
institutions 
All parties 58.2 72 23.2 57 -.357 0.00 
FIDESZ 31.6 19 15.0 40  n.s. 
MSZP 70.0 37 66.7 9  n.s. 
Intervention of the EU 
All parties 59.7 72 27.1 57 -.329 0.00 
FIDESZ 47.9 19 22.0 41 -.258 0.05 
MSZP 64.9 37 66.7 9  n.s. 
Coordinated action of 
national governments 
All parties 51.4 72 71.0 57 .201 0.18 
FIDESZ 52.6 19 75.0 40  n.s. 
MSZP 52,6 38 33,0 9  n.s. 
Autonomous action of 
national government 
All parties 35.2 72 77.1 57 .422 0.00 
FIDESZ 47.4 19 87.5 40 .431 0.00 
MSZP 35.6 39 33.3 9  n.s. 
Percent of those who think that the solutions below are the first two options out of four. 
Note: The exact wording of the question was: ”In view of the current financial crisis and of the 
need to reduce its impact upon the economy of your country place the following alternatives 
in decreasing order of preference: first/ second/ third/ fourth choice/ none of them/ Don’t 
know/ Don’t answer“. 
 
Compared to other countries included in the research the Hungarian MPs’ 
opinion change shows the characteristics of over-average falling interest in 
international intervention and growing need of national solutions. In the case of 
falling trust in the intervention of the EU Hungarian changes are against the 
general tendency: while in Hungary this solution did drop to more than half, 
HSR 41 (2016) 4  │  113 
it’s popularity remained unchanged in the rest of the countries on the average 
(and in most of the comparable country cases even grew – except for Greece). 
An intergovernmentalist solution became more popular in Hungary, but the 
opposite happened in the rest of the countries. In most of the countries federal-
ist and intergovernmentalist solutions were and remained the most popular ones 
(in spite of internal changes: federalist solutions gained and intergovernmental-
ist coordinated action lost from popularity).  
In Hungary the supranational and federalist solutions used to be the most 
and became the least popular ones. The Hungarian changes differ from the rest 
of the countries in terms of intensity as well. Falling popularity of supranation-
al intervention of financial institutions is a general tendency, what is specific in 
the case of Hungary, it is the size of the change: from three to five below a 
quarter. In the opposite direction the same is true in the case of growing popu-
larity of economic nationalism: this solution became more popular in most of 
the countries, but it more than doubled among Hungarian MPs. 
3.2  Changes in Perception of European Social Solidarity 
Perception of social solidarity in the European Union will be dealt with through 
different aspects. As Ellison (2012) puts it, it has a normative aspect, i.e. repre-
sents shared values while it’s also manifested through concrete policies. The 
measure chosen to represent social solidarity is a variable about the preferred 
main aim, or the principle of the European Union, whether it has to enhance 
economic competitiveness of its Member States or represent social security. 
The latter answer was considered to be a valid proxy to measure the preference 
for social solidarity across the European Union trying to grasp the normative 
aspect of the term. To measure the manifestation of social solidarity we have 
taken two policy areas into account: social security and cohesion policy at the 
EU level. Elite members had to evaluate whether they would approve of these 
policy areas within 10 years. A common social security system is showing a 
responsibility for the well-being of other Europeans and the readiness to give 
up autonomy as Niznik puts it (2012). They are also representing a suprana-
tional approach as opposed to intergovernmentalism. A common system of 
social security and cohesion policy, i.e. increased help for regions in difficulties 
are manifestations of caring for other group members. Responsibility and car-
ing for others involves the feeling of unity among Europeans, the perception 
that they form one common group. Identification with Europe or European 
identity is a widely debated concept, nevertheless, for the purpose of our analy-
sis we have chosen to include the aspect of belonging or attachment to Europe 
without wanting to enter much in this debate. 
Taking the idea of Europe as a common group further, it is interesting to see 
how elites react if an ‘out-group’ is in question. This way social solidarity will 
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also be addressed through the perception of immigration, to what extent it is 
considered as a threat for the European Union. 
Changes in the perception of the EU’s main role over the studied period 
proved to be significant. The majority of the Hungarian parliamentary elite (59-
60%) think that preserving economic competitiveness should be the EU’s main 
objectives both in 2007 and 2014 with a slight drop following the crisis in 2009 
(53%). Whereas social security is considered to be the principle aim by 29% in 
2007, which significantly dropped by 2014 to 9%. On the other hand, the share 
of those considering both important has risen from 13% to 26% (see Table 3). 
It seems that the crisis pushed Hungarian MPs to think that social security was 
also an important aim beside economic competitiveness. 
Table 3: Changes in the Perception of the EU’s Main Aim: Competitiveness vs. 
Social Security (%) 
  
All 
parties 
Party Cramer's V 
(comparison 
across parties)
p-
value FIDESZ MSZP 
2007 More competitive 58.8 52.0 58.5 .300 .072 
Better social security 28.8 44.0 24.4  
Both 12.5 4.0 17.1  
n 80 25 41  
2009 More competitive 52.8 57.9 47.5 n.s. 
Better social security 20.8 21.1 22.5  
Both 22.2 21.1 25.0  
n 72 19 40  
2014 More competitive 64.8 78.1 14.3 .514 .000 
Better social security 9.3 3.1 0.0  
Both 25.8 18.8 85.7  
n 54 32 7  
 
Cramer's V (comparison 
across waves) .179 .333 .311  
p-value .038 .010 .009  
Note: The exact wording of the question was: ”I’m going to read you two statements. Please 
tell me which of them comes closest to your view: (1) The main aim of the EU should be to 
make the European economy more competitive in world markets, (2)The main aim of the EU 
should be to provide better social security for all its citizens”. 
 
Compared to other countries included in the research, Hungarian MPs are the 
ones with the highest share of preference for increasing economic competitive-
ness both in 2009 and 2014. In this respect the change in governance did not 
have an overall impact. The elites with the highest share preferring better social 
security over economic competitiveness were those in Italy, Portugal, Spain, 
Greece and Germany both in 2009 and 2014. While Hungarian parliamentari-
ans were clearly the last in this respect in 2014, in 2009 this was still not the 
case. 
Changes were significant both among FIDESZ and MSZP MPs, however, 
with different trends. In opposition FIDESZ MPs showed the highest share of 
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preference for social security (44%) which reduced to 3% by 2014 with in-
creasing share of preference for competitiveness. On the contrary, the prefer-
ence for competitiveness on its own among MSZP MPs lost of its importance 
and 86% of them expressed the preference for both competitiveness and social 
security in 2014 when in opposition. It seems that a party being in governance 
enhances economic pragmatism. 
MPs were also asked about the different manifestation of social solidarity in 
the European Union, whether they would approve a common system of social 
security and more help for regions in difficulties within 10 years. As an imme-
diate effect of the crisis, the preference for these increased from 2007 to 2009, 
however, enthusiasm significantly dropped by 2014 within the new Parliament. 
In this regard, MSZP MPs differed from FIDESZ MPs as the change in their 
attitudes was not significant in terms of social security and the help for the 
regions when they went from being in governance to opposition (see Table 4). 
Overall, differences between the positions of the MPs of the two parties were 
not significant over the different waves. 
In the case of a common system of social security and an increased cohesion 
policy the change was not so dramatic, Hungarian political elites showing a 
moderate position compared to elites in other European countries both in 2009 
and 2014. Nevertheless, in 2009, Hungary was one of the most devoted sup-
porters of a common system of social security. 
Table 4: Perception of the Character of the EU in 10 years 
  
2007 n 2009 n 2014 n 
2007>2009 2009>2014 
t-test p-value t-test
p-
value 
Common 
system of 
social 
security 
All parties 4.1 79 4.2 71 3.4 56 n.s. 3.796 .000 
FIDESZ 4.2 25 4.2 19 3.3 31 n.s. 2.497 .016 
MSZP 4.2 40 4.2 39 4.3 8 n.s. n.s. 
t-test   -3.601   
p-value n.s.  n.s.  .001   
More help 
for re-
gions with 
economic 
or social 
difficulties 
All parties 4.7 80 4.7 72 4.5 57 n.s. 2.204 .030 
FIDESZ 4.6 25 4.7 19 4.5 32 n.s. n.s. 
MSZP 4.7 41 4.8 40 4.6 8 n.s. n.s. 
t-test  
p-value n.s.  n.s.  n.s.      
Mean values on a 1-5 scale where 1 is 'strongly against’, 5 is 'strongly in favour'.  
Note: the exact wording of the question was: ”Thinking about the European Union over the 
next 10 years, can you tell me whether you are in favour or against the following: Common 
social security// More help for regions in economic or social difficulties. (5) Strongly in favour, 
(4) Somewhat in favour, (3) Neither in favour or against, (2) Somewhat against, (1) Strongly 
against“. 
 
Attachment to Europe is not an immanent indicator of European social solidari-
ty, but it might be closely related (Örkény 2011), so it is worth to briefly pre-
sent its trends as well. As opposed to previous measures, in this regard the 
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changes in attitudes did not prove to be significant. This is an important result 
because it implies that in symbolic terms European affiliation remained an 
important value for Hungarian political forces. Nevertheless attachment has 
been slightly decreasing in 2014 compared to previous waves, first of all due to 
FIDESZ (and Jobbik) MPs. MSZP MPs on the other hand showed signs of 
increasing attachment to Europe over the period. The difference between left 
and right party MPs became significant in 2014. What is important here is the 
change in intensity. Hungarian MPs were among the most attached to Europe 
in 2009, right after Germany, while they were rather among the moderately 
attached in 2014 when Spanish, Italian and Portuguese elites were the most 
enthusiastic.  
Table 5: Attachment to Europe  
 
2007 n 2009 n 2014 n 
2007>2009 2009>2014 
t-test p-value t-test p-value 
All parties 3.4 80 3.4 72 3.2 56  n.s. -1.86 0.065 
FIDESZ 3.3 25 3.2 19 3.2 31  n.s.  n.s. 
MSZP 3.4 41 3.5 40 3.6 8  n.s.  n.s. 
t-test     2.05        
Sign. n.s.   n.s.  0.048        
Mean values of a 1-4 scale where 1 is ‘not at all attached’, 4 is ‘very attached’. 
Note: The exact wording of the question was: “People feel different degrees of attachment to 
their region, to their country and to Europe. What about you? Are you (4) very attached, (3) 
somewhat attached, (2) not very attached or (1) not at all attached to Europe?” 
 
As already mentioned, the perception of third-country immigration can be 
linked to the feeling of belonging to a European common group, how people 
are reacting to a potential threat to the common group coming from outside of 
the group – having this way an indirect impact on European social solidarity 
that grasps the level of ‘exclusive’ Europeanness (immigration is considered to 
be a threat). However, the perception of migration is also a direct measure of 
social solidarity in general and could also grasp the level of ‘inclusive’ Euro-
peanness (immigration is not considered to be a threat).  
Results of the different waves of the research show that fear decreased sig-
nificantly from 2007 to 2009 (first of all due to the changes in the opinions of 
the MSZP MPs), while it increased by 2014 to a level higher than that of 2007 
(see Table 6). It is worth to note that the survey took place before the first wave 
of refugees arrived, nevertheless, it shows that the very negative context al-
ready existed. It is also important to note that FIDESZ MPs did not change 
their opinion from 2007 to 2009, but there was a negative change once in gov-
ernment. FIDESZ MPs were also more to consider non-EU immigrants as a 
threat than their MSZP counterparts. 
Hungarian parliamentarians were neither amongst those most feeling threat-
ened nor amongst those least feeling threatened in 2007 and 2009, they were 
rather in the middle compared to other countries included in the research. The 
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significant negative change in the opinions by 2014, however, made Hungarian 
political elites the most threatened by immigration coming from non-EU coun-
tries. 
Table 6: Perception of Immigration from non EU Countries 
 
2007 n 2009 n 2014 n 
2007>2009 2009>2014 
t-test p-value t-test p-value 
All parties 2.5 79 2.9 68 2.1 55 -2.762 0.006 5.054 0.000 
FIDESZ 2.3 24 2.2 17 1.8 31  n.s. 2.186 0.034 
MSZP 2.6 41 3.1 39 2.4 8 -2.267 0.026 2.218 0.032 
t-test   -3.708   -2.098        
Sign. n.s.   0.00   .043         
Mean values on a 1-4 scale where 1 is 'big threat', 4 is 'no threat at all'.  
Note: The exact wording of the question was: ”Do you think that (ITEM) is a threat or not a 
threat for the EU: Immigration from non EU countries? (1) a big threat, (2) quite a big threat, 
(3) not that big a threat, (4) not a threat at all, Don’t know/can’t say, Refuse”. 
 
The presented measures of European social solidarity were summed up in one 
additive index where the normative aspect of the concept and its policy mani-
festation were taken into account. The additive index was created from the 
standardized values of three different measures (main aim of the EU is eco-
nomic competitiveness or social security, approve of a common system of 
social security and increased help for regions in difficulties within 10 years), 
the index was based on measures that correlate well with the final index. At-
tachment to Europe and the perception of third-country immigrants were not 
included in the index due to low correlation. The index shows that European 
solidarity of Hungarian MPs remained relatively unchanged from 2007 to 2009 
while it significantly decreased by 2014 in the changed Parliament (see Table 
7). The decreasing solidarity was probably due to important decline among 
FIDESZ parliamentarians while MSZP MPs did not change their position sig-
nificantly.  
Table 7: Social Solidarity Index 
 
2007 n 2009 n 2014 n 
2007>2009 2009>2014 
t-test p-value t-test p-value 
All parties 0.28 79 0.40 71 -0.91 56  n.s. 3.771 .000 
FIDESZ 0.54 25 0.26 19 -1.28 31  n.s. 2.737 .009 
MSZP 0.35 40 0.61 39 0.38 8  n.s.  n.s. 
t-test     -2.400      
p-value n.s.  n.s.  .022      
Note: The index ranged between -5.35 and 3.21 with a mean value of 0. Higher values mean 
higher support for solidarity at the European level. Nonparametric correlations with the final 
construct: main aim of the EU should be economic competitiveness or social security (0.704), 
approve of a common system of social security (0.723), increased help for regions in difficul-
ties (0.593). 
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There was no significant difference in solidarity between the governing and the 
biggest opposition party in the Parliament before 2010. The gap between the 
two parties became noticeable after the elections when FIDESZ became a 
governing party.  
3.3  Changes in the Perception along the Nation vs. EU Dimension 
In terms of the attitudes towards the European integration process favouring 
further European unification is a good proxy for the kind of European Union 
one wishes. There was and still there is a solid majority of further unification’s 
support in the investigated countries. The growing standard deviation in some 
cases, including Hungary suggests that in the Parliaments of these countries a 
growing polarization could have been observed concerning the issue of Euro-
pean unification. But Hungary is the only among the investigated countries 
where the average on a scale of 0 to 10 (where 0 is that unification has gone too 
far and 10 means that further unification is to be supported) did fall below 5, 
that is, where the dominant opinion moved to the Eurosceptic side.  
Hungarian opinions concerning unification were similar to the majority of 
the countries included in the research in 2009: two-third majority supported 
further unification. These opinions haven’t been changed on the average in the 
rest of the countries as opposed to Hungary. Until 2010 the overwhelming 
majority of the Hungarian political elite supported further unification of the 
European Union. A telling sign of the changing structure and changing mood 
of the elite is that the proportion of supporters did drop dramatically (from the 
previous two-third to a quarter) while the proportion of those who have no 
characteristic opinion and of those who are against unification grew. The pro-
portion of those who oppose further unification is almost six times higher than 
it used to be in 2009.  
Looking at the breakdowns according to party structure (see Table 8) it be-
comes clear that the newly emerging far-right Jobbik is totally against further 
unification while the governing FIDESZ moved from supporter to hesitant and 
opposing position. Socialists’ opinion remained supportive but their proportion 
did drop significantly. Although there were differences between parties in 2007 
and 2009 in terms of supporting further unification, these differences proved to 
be insignificant. In 2014 however differences between party positions became 
significantly polarized.  
Another element of the attitudes towards the EU and the kind of European 
construct one would imagine is the perception of the role of the member state. 
These attitudes are also good proxies for the intergovernmentalist vs. federalist 
attitudes. Two-third of Hungarian MPs thought in 2007 and 2009 that Member 
States ought to remain the central actors of the EU and their proportion grew 
significantly, over four-fifth in the meantime. In 2009 the Hungarian elite was 
slightly below the investigated countries’ average (70%) in sharing the ‘nation 
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state as central actor‘ view. For 2014 the average grew and Hungary did out-
grow this change.  
Table 8: Unification has Already Gone too far or Should be Strengthened: 
Changes of Opinions (%) 
  Unification 
has already 
gone too far 
(0-3) 
In between 
(4-6) 
Unification 
should be 
strengthened 
(7-10) 
n 
Cramer’s 
V (p-
value) 
2007 All parties 13.9 30.4 55.7 79 n.s. 
FIDESZ 16.7 41.7 41.7 24  
MSZP 9.8 29.3 61.0 41  
2009 All parties 5.8 27.5 66.7 69 n.s. 
FIDESZ 5.6 33.3 61.1 18  
MSZP 2.6 25.6 71.8 39  
2014 All parties 34.5 40 25.5 55 .69 (.000) 
FIDESZ 29 64.5 6.5 32  
MSZP 14.3 0.0 85.7 7  
Note: The exact wording of the question was: ”Some say European unification should be 
strengthened. Others say it already has gone too far. What is your opinion? Please indicate 
your views using a 10-point-scale. On this scale, '0' means unification ‘has already gone too 
far’ and '10' means it ‘should be strengthened’. What number on this scale best describes your 
position?” 
 
As for the two main parties in the Hungarian Parliament (see Table 9), FIDESZ 
MPs showed a significantly more pronounced intergovernmentalist attitude 
than MSZP parliamentarians both in 2007 and 2014. Over time, while there 
was a significant move towards perceptions of Member States as central actors 
both among the Hungarian Parliament in general and FIDESZ in particular 
from 2009 to 2014, MSZP parliamentarians did not significantly change their 
opinion. 
Table 9: Perception of Member States as Central Actors 
 
2007 n 2009 n 2014 n 
2007>2009 2009>2014 
t-test p-value t-test p-value 
All parties 2.08 79 2.11 71 1.49 57  n.s. 3.935 .000 
FIDESZ 1.48 25 1.89 19 1.16 32  n.s. 3.498 .002 
MSZP 2.45 40 2.25 40 2.50 8  n.s.  n.s. 
t-test -4.182    -4.885      
p-value .000  n.s.  .001      
Mean values on a 1-4 scale where 1 is ‘Agree strongly’ and 4 is ‘Disagree strongly’. 
Note: The exact wording of the question was: ”How much do you agree with the following 
statement: The Member States ought to remain the central actors of the European Union. (1) 
Agree strongly, (2) Agree somewhat, (3) Disagree somewhat, (4) Disagree strongly, Don’t know, 
Refuse”. 
 
Tax redistribution is another important element and measure of attitudes to-
wards European integration and the kind of EU one would favour. Eventual 
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federalist attitudes could be grasped through the delegation of tax redistribution 
to the European level (see Table 10). In international comparison Hungarian 
MPs put the greatest emphasis on national level redistribution and they are 
below the average in terms of fair sub-and supranational redistribution propor-
tions in 2014. A clear tendency in the evaluation of the optimal combination of 
levels of redistribution is that the Hungarian MPs gradually put more emphasis 
on the national level and less on the sub- and supranational ones. It is striking 
that the sub-national level’s proportion decreased significantly: from the origi-
nal two-fifth to less than one-quarter. In this respect the opinions about fair 
redistribution breakdowns do coincide with centralization efforts of the gov-
ernment. The proportion of European level redistribution decreased from one to 
six to one-eights between 2007 and 2014. The decreasing mean value jointly 
appeared with a significantly growing standard deviation, which means that the 
opinions became more polarized in this respect. Nevertheless, in terms of EU-
level redistribution changes over time were not statistically significant, neither 
were party differences despite the general tendency that FIDESZ MPs would 
less favour EU-level redistribution than MSZP parliamentarians. 
Table 10: Out of Hundred Euro of Tax a Citizen Pays, how much Should be 
Allocated on Regional, National and European Level  
 regional level national level European level n 
2007 38.3  (17.5) 44.6  (18.1) 17.1   (9.2) 77 
2009 34.7  (17.7) 49.8  (19.6) 15.5  (10.7) 62 
2014 21.9  (20.4) 65.3  (26.3) 12.8  (16.4) 53 
Mean on a 0-100 scale and (standard deviation). 
Note: The exact wording of the question was: ”Out of one hundred Euro [/ national currency 
when relevant] of tax money a citizen pays, how much should be allocated on the regional, 
national and European level?” 
 
In order to sum up attitudes towards the EU along the nation vs. EU dimension, 
similarly to European solidarity, an additive index was created based on the 
standardized values of the measures included. The created index was based on 
those variables available for the three years that correlated well with the final 
construct (unification should be strengthened, (disagreement with) nation state 
should remain the central actor, proportion of tax to be allocated on European 
level). In this sense, this index aims at to grasp at the different ideas that might 
exist about the construction of the European Union. It entails the perception of 
national sovereignty or supranational regulation but also elements of the tradi-
tional intergovernmentalist vs. federalist approach with different role attributed 
to the Member States or nations and the delegation of competences in terms of 
redistribution to the European Union.  
The index indeed shows that a significant shift happened between 2009 and 
2014 in the attitudes of the parliamentarians in general favouring the nation as 
opposed to the EU (see Table 11). This was mainly due to the change in the 
HSR 41 (2016) 4  │  121 
structure of the Parliament after the 2010 elections when FIDESZ got the two 
third majority: there was a significant difference between FIDESZ and MSZP 
MPs all over the three waves the formers favouring the nation over the EU as 
opposed to the latters. Furthermore, while the FIDESZ MPs further turned to 
the national level by 2014, their MSZP counterparts followed the opposite 
tendency favouring even more the EU level5. 
Table 11: The Index on the Nation vs. EU Dimension 
 
2007 n 2009 n 2014 n 
2007>2009 2009>2014 
t-test p-value t-test p-value 
All parties 0.39 75 0.57 60. -1.14 51  n.s. 3.758 0.000 
FIDESZ -0.44 22 -0.26 16 -1.79 28  n.s. 2.918 0.006 
MSZP 0.78 39 0.78 35 2.41 6  n.s. -2.041 0.048 
t-test -2.933  -2.415  -5.108      
p-value 0.005  0.020  0.000      
Note: The index ranged between -4.63 and 6.43 with a mean value of 0.03. Higher values 
mean higher support for the EU on the nation vs. EU dimension. Nonparametric correlations 
with the final construct: unification should be strengthened (0.775), (disagreement with) 
nation state should remain the central actor(0.774), proportion of tax distributed on European 
level (0.673). 
4.  Correlates of the Attitudes  
In the following we are presenting models on the different factors influencing 
perceptions and attitudes towards the EU among Hungarian MPs. First the 
correlates of the perception of European social solidarity will be analyzed 
followed by the analysis of the nation vs. European Union dimension. The 
analysis will be based on the previously presented indices. The two indices had 
a weak (0.13) correlation with each other which means that they are measuring 
different phenomena and are this way presenting different aspects of the atti-
tudes towards the EU.  
When it comes to the determinants of the perception of European social sol-
idarity and the nation vs. European Union dimension our aim was to see the 
effect of the crisis, the change in government and the subsequent change in the 
structure of the Parliament. These were measured through the effect of the 
different waves, comparing wave 2009 and 2014 to 2007: the first (change 
from 2007 to 2009) was supposed to indicate the effect of the crisis, while the 
second the (change from 2007 to 2014) was supposed to grasp the effect of the 
changed Parliament. In order to control for the changed party structure, we 
have also included party affiliation in the models. Nevertheless, only FIDESZ 
                                                             
5  Although the 2014 sample size for MSZP MPs giving a valid answer for the three measures 
of the index was very low (6). 
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and MSZP are directly measured due to comparability issues over the waves, 
but they are also the two parties that changed their position as government or 
opposition over the period. 
In order to control for some potential other effects we have included the 
gender and the year of birth as socio-demographic variables. Foreign contacts 
might also have an implication on attitudes and perceptions of the EU, this is 
why we have included two variables controlling for this effect: whether one has 
lived in the EU and the frequency of professional contacts with the EU. In 
addition to these factors, in Model 2 and 4 (see Table 12 and 13) attachment to 
Europe and the perception of immigration were also included. As previously 
presented the feeling of belonging to a group enhance solidarity with group 
members and the capability to give up autonomy for the sake of the group, 
while the perception of the threat that third-country immigrants might represent 
can be either directly or (through the attachment) indirectly linked to the per-
ception of social solidarity, however, these measures did not correlate well with 
the final index grasping social solidarity. In our analysis we wanted to see if 
these elements had an impact on our other, the nation vs. the EU dimension as 
well. 
It has to be noted, however, that, although our methodology is a regression 
approach, the reported links do not necessarily represent causal relations. 
4.1  Correlates of the Perception of Social Solidarity 
The results of the OLS regression models show that the described variables 
explain about 8.5% of the variance of the support for European social solidari-
ty, while the inclusion of the attachment to Europe did not significantly 
changed neither the explanatory power of the model nor the parameters. The 
inclusion of the perception of the threat third-country immigrants lead to simi-
lar results: besides not having a significant impact, the explaining power of the 
model was not improved either (see Table 12).  
The change in Parliament, on the other hand, had a significant impact on how 
much Hungarian MPs are in favour of social solidarity at the EU level. Percep-
tions in 2007 and in 2009 are not significantly differing from each other (within 
the same Parliament), 2014 perceptions, however, are significantly less positive 
even after controlling for party affiliation. MSZP MPs seem to be more enthusi-
astic about social solidarity at the EU level. Furthermore, women are also more 
positive towards solidarity than men. This is also an important indicator to be 
controlled for as with the 2010 elections gender structure of the Parliament 
changed as well: the share of women dropped. On the other hand, the general 
left-right political preferences, if this is included in the model instead of party 
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affiliation6, do not have a significant impact on the perception of solidarity de-
spite expectations that leftist self-positioning would favour solidarity. 
Table 12: Explanations for the Perception of a European Social Solidarity (OLS 
regression) 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t 
p-
value
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t 
p- 
value B 
Std. 
Error Beta B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
(Constant) 0.35 28.57  0.01 0.99 -2.65 30.05  -0.09 0.93 
Female 0.88 0.44 0.14 2.00 0.05 0.82 0.44 0.14 1.84 0.07 
Year of 
Birth 
0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.98 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.04 0.97 
Has lived 
in another 
EU country 
-0.55 0.36 -0.11 -1.52 0.13 -0.53 0.39 -0.10 -1.37 0.17 
EU 
contacts 
once a 
week 
0.27 0.37 0.06 0.74 0.46 0.03 0.38 0.01 0.09 0.93 
EU 
contacts 
once a 
month 
0.31 0.32 0.07 0.97 0.33 0.27 0.33 0.06 0.82 0.42 
MP First 
term 
-0.36 0.33 -0.08 -1.10 0.27 -0.44 0.34 -0.10 -1.29 0.20 
FIDESZ 0.41 0.38 0.10 1.09 0.28 0.36 0.40 0.09 0.89 0.37 
MSZP 0.69 0.37 0.17 1.86 0.06 0.56 0.38 0.14 1.48 0.14 
wave2009 0.13 0.32 0.03 0.39 0.69 0.00 0.33 0.00 -0.01 0.99 
wave2014 -1.07 0.40 -0.24 -2.65 0.01 -0.95 0.42 -0.21 -2.29 0.02 
Attach-
ment to 
Europe 
     0.26 0.21 0.09 1.27 0.21 
Immi-
grants: 
threat 
(disagree) 
     0.24 0.17 0.11 1.39 0.17 
Adjusted 
R Square 
.085     .087     
Reference categories: male, EU contacts less often than once a month, other parties, wave 
2007. 
 
This way, there has been a significant drop in the support for social solidarity at 
the EU level from 2007 to 2014. This is partly explained by the changed gov-
ernment: the share of MSZP MPs, representing more positive perceptions, 
decreased within the new Parliament, while similar tendencies applied to wom-
                                                             
6  Left-right political self-positioning and party affiliation were included in separate models 
due to redundancy. Only models including party affiliation are presented here, however, 
results of the models were very similar. 
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en. This way, the change in perceptions might indeed be attributed to the 
change in the structure of the Parliament, however, after controlling for these 
variables, the significant impact of 2014 still persist. This might suggest that 
there are other factors behind this tendency, not just party affiliation. The de-
creasing enthusiasm in terms of solidarity might be a more general phenome-
non, perhaps due to the effect of crisis that appeared later and not immediately 
after. 
4.2  The “Nation vs. EU” Dimension 
Models run for the “nation vs. EU” dimension had a higher explaining power 
than those run for the perception of social solidarity (with 22-29% of the vari-
ance explained). It seems that the variables included are more correlating with 
this aspect of the opinions. Gender and age proved to be insignificant just as 
parliamentary experience, while foreign contacts and having lived abroad have 
negative impact on nationalist attitude (see Model 3&4 in Table 13). Similarly 
to European embeddedness (frequent contacts with the EU and having lived in 
another EU country), attachment to Europe also significantly reduces national-
ist attitudes (see Model 4). As opposed to support for social solidarity at the EU 
level, the inclusion of the attachment to Europe and the perception of third-
country immigrants are having a significant impact: they increase the model’s 
(Model 4, see Table 13) explanatory power to 29%; lower level of attachment 
to Europe and perceiving immigration as a threat are also strongly associated 
with nationalist attitudes. 
Taking the three years together the “nation vs. EU” index has strong signifi-
cant correlation with the left-right scale and with the position of the investigat-
ed parties as well (FIDESZ and MSZP). In general left self-positioning favours 
pro-EU attitudes. This finding seems to confirm previous suggestions that 
attitudes towards integration and left-right positions are linked (e.g. Hooghe 
and Marks 1999).  
In terms of party affiliation there are however specificities to be taken into 
account according to periods. In 2007 Jobbik was not in the Parliament yet and 
FIDESZ, in opposition had a strong economic nationalist position. The same 
was the case in 2009, MSZP affiliation and the left-right scale had no signifi-
cant correlation with the nation vs. EU dimension. For 2014 the situation has 
been changed in the sense that Jobbik was already in the Parliament and MSZP 
was in opposition. To understand this clearly it does need a short explanation. 
Just before the 2010 landslide elections FIDESZ started to realize a party pro-
gram of the so called “central field of force”: giving up the consensual model 
of democracy and pushing left-and right wing competitors to the margin via 
establishing a super-majority. They did succeed and the results are a new con-
stitution, new media law, new code of labor underpinning a workfare regime 
and a new ideology of illiberalism. 
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Table 13: Explanations for the “Nation vs. EU” Dimension (OLS Regressions) 
 Model 3 Model 4 
 Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t 
p-
value 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t 
p-
value B 
Std. 
Error Beta B 
Std. 
Error Beta 
(Constant) -11.59 30.68  -0.38 0.71 -39.91 30.90  -1.29 0.20 
Female -0.51 0.48 -0.07 -1.06 0.29 -0.72 0.47 -0.10 -1.54 0.12 
Year of 
Birth 
0.01 0.02 0.03 0.37 0.71 0.02 0.02 0.09 1.19 0.24 
Has lived 
in another 
EU 
country 
1.14 0.40 0.19 2.88 0.00 1.04 0.39 0.18 2.69 0.01 
EU 
contacts 
once a 
week 
0.89 0.39 0.17 2.27 0.02 0.73 0.38 0.14 1.91 0.06 
EU 
contacts 
once a 
month 
0.52 0.35 0.10 1.47 0.14 0.48 0.35 0.09 1.38 0.17 
MP First 
term 
0.44 0.36 0.09 1.20 0.23 0.29 0.35 0.06 0.83 0.41 
FIDESZ -0.95 0.41 -0.20 -2.32 0.02 -0.74 0.42 -0.16 -1.76 0.08 
MSZP 0.39 0.41 0.09 0.97 0.33 0.37 0.40 0.08 0.93 0.35 
wave2009 0.25 0.35 0.05 0.71 0.48 0.00 0.34 0.00 0.00 1.00 
wave2014 -1.19 0.44 -0.24 -2.72 0.01 -1.09 0.44 -0.22 -2.50 0.01 
Attach-
ment to 
Europe 
     0.67 0.22 0.21 3.09 0.00 
Immi-
grants: 
threat 
(disagree) 
     0.43 0.17 0.18 2.46 0.01 
Adjusted 
R Square 
.224  .291  
Reference categories: male, EU contacts less often than once a month, other parties, wave 
2007. 
 
Being the dominant actors of the “central field of force”7, however, they have 
lost from the efficiency of vote maximizing nationalist populism especially in 
EU-issues. In government FIDESZ is under double pressure: on the one hand it 
faces competition from the far-right, while being on government on the other 
hand it does realize the complexity of EU-issues more intensively. There is a 
difference between media position of the party and the opinion of MPs belong-
                                                             
7  A concept first used in 2009 by Viktor Orbán. Refers to a governance structure where the 
country is led by a dominant political force with high public support having smaller parties 
in opposition both on the left and on the right of it.  
HSR 41 (2016) 4  │  126 
ing to it. One has to do with mobilizing ideology, the other one is closer to the 
terrain of “realpolitik”. 
In terms of the effect of time, only the 2014 wave shows a significantly in-
creased nationalist attitude, there is no significant difference between 2007 and 
2009. This seems to be consistent with the fact that the Parliament and its com-
position was the same in 2007 and 2009, the change occurred with the 2010 
elections. This also means that the crisis did not have a significant impact on 
parliamentarians’ attitudes, the change was rather due to the altered composi-
tion of the new Parliament. However, this impact still persists after controlling 
for party affiliation which means that increasing nationalist attitudes are not 
only due to the increased FIDESZ presence in the Parliament. 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
This paper has an exploratory character. We intended to investigate how Hun-
garian parliamentary elites’ attitudes changed toward European solidarity and 
nationalism between 2007 and 2014. This way we intended to measure the 
impacts of the 2008 economic crisis and that of the 2010 landslide elections in 
Hungary. While there were no robust immediate impacts of the crisis between 
2007 and 2009, longer term effects proved to be important. Erosion of elite 
consensus started already in the first decade of post-socialism and the signs of 
simulated democracy became apparent before the economic crisis of 2008. 
During the 2010 elections the conservative FIDESZ won supermajority and an 
extreme right party (Jobbik) got into the Parliament, while the former left par-
ties lost positions and became fragmented.  
Fundamental changes, including new constitution, new media law, centrali-
zation of resources did follow the 2/3rd majority which did put an end to the 
period of consensual liberal democracy envisaged during the post-socialist 
transformation. Current governing elites describe the regime in terms of illiber-
al democracy, while critics (Martin 2016, Körösényi and Patkós 2015, Enyedi 
2015, Kis 2014, Lengyel 2014, Zakaria 2014) draw attention on clientelism, 
populism and features of an electoral authoritarian regime in the making.  
The results of this investigation by and large are consonant with these 
tendencies. During the studied period the views of economic nationalism and 
intergovernmentalism grew in popularity and became predominant among 
Hungarian elites. Both changing elite composition and changing discourse 
might have played a role in this. The support for European social solidarity 
decreased and the need for competition grew in the mind of Hungarian elites. 
They want to centralize revenues on the national level and distribute less on the 
levels on the sub-national regions and on the EU. They turned from enthusiast 
to sceptic about the further unification of the EU due to changes both in terms 
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of composition and mood. On the other hand the majority is still attached to 
Europe and feels that the country has benefited from the EU-membership.  
Models built on the explanation of solidarity and nationalism prove the im-
portance of party affiliation and of the time factor after 2010. Whereas being a 
FIDESZ MP increases nationalist attitudes, being an MSZP MP increases the 
wish for social solidarity at the European level – this latter being a socialist 
party, results follow the ideological stand of these parties. Another difference 
between the correlates of the perception of social solidarity and the correlates 
of nationalist attitudes is that while nationalist attitudes are clearly influenced 
by social and cultural resources of MPs (contacts and attachment, having lived 
in another country), the perception of social solidarity does not depend on these 
factors. In this sense attachment to Europe seems to be less an indicator of 
common identity formation but rather an experience of the EU. These results 
suggest that support for solidarity at the EU level has a more general character, 
it might represent a more abstract value that is not so much influenced by con-
crete experiences or problems while having a strong gender character.  
This way, the initial elite consensus on the need for Hungary to become a 
member of the EU seems to have been eroded by 2014, or at least MPs opin-
ions differ regarding the ideal kind of EU Hungary should be member of. Dif-
ferences are the most visible in 2014: MPs of the governing party are less at-
tached to Europe than representatives of the previous governing party and they 
also imagine an EU that aims at increasing economic competition as opposed to 
social solidarity.  
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